


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7 June 1965

Briefly Noted



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Truth	<u>Khrushchev's Role in the</u>
About	<u>Battle of Stalingrad Now</u>
WW II?	<u>Minimized.</u>

In the official six-volume history of World War II, published under the then Premier Nikita Khrushchev, he was credited with a prominent role in the defense of Stalingrad (now Volgograd) and in planning the great counter-offensive that caught the Germans there. This volume, "The Great Victory of the Volga"

was edited by Marshal Konstantin K. Rokossovsky, who should have known the facts since he participated in the Stalingrad operation as commander of the Don front.

The Soviet Union published a new history of the Battle of Stalingrad -- on 25 May 1965. This volume is described by its authors as "more objective" than previous works. In it, Khrushchev is mentioned only twice, simply as a member of the military council in the area in 1942; no strategic decisions are attributed to him. Credit for the battle is given mainly to marshals and other military leaders directly in command of the Red Army, such as Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov. Zhukov was discredited by Mr. K. in 1957; he was brought back for public ceremonies, the 20th anniversary of WW II, just recently. (See NYTimes and Press Comment 26 May 1965.)

The simple principles of Soviet history writing are repeated in this one further example. Facts are distorted, falsified or otherwise manipulated to credit friends and discredit enemies. Soviet claims to their own success and attacks on the performance of former allies during the course of World War II should be challenged with such examples as this new "history." [See also Moscow Interprets World War Two, identified in the BN section of the last BPG issue #166]

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Col. Abel What the Chekists Did
Honored in the Great War

At the 20th anniversary of VE-Day, with every Soviet dignitary recounting the victories of the Red Army in the Great Fatherland War, the Soviet press had little to say about the contribution of the other Allies. Pravda did, however, have room for a lengthy article by the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB), V. Ye. Semichastny, telling how the Soviet Chekists "won the fierce battle on the invisible front of struggle against the intelligence services of the Hitlerite coalition." Semichastny admitted that there had been "serious distortions and errors in the work of the organs of state security" in "the period of the personality cult," but claimed that this did not change "the socialist nature of Soviet intelligence and counter-intelligence and ... did not separate it from the party and the people." He added: "It was precisely the close links of the overwhelming majority of the Chekists with the people that created those conditions which in the final analysis predetermined their victory over the intelligence of fascist Germany." Semichastny also listed the "heroes" of Soviet intelligence, and paid his respects to "the intelligence agent known under the name of Rudolf Abel." A few days before, on 4 May, a Moscow television program had given the first Soviet publicity to Abel, indicating that he had been decorated after his repatriation in 1962. (See attachment for text of Semichastny article.)


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Useful Background Material

on

COMMUNIST-NAZI Relations in WORLD WAR II

Two unclassified, well sourced, unattributed multilithed papers provide the historical facts of Communist-Nazi relations during World War II.

The first and longer (175 pages) is more comprehensive in its treatment, covering not only the war period but CPSU activities and relations in Germany from 1918 through the war, and describing Soviet activities in individual countries, i.e., France, Italy, Greece and Czechoslovakia during the war. COMMUNIST-NAZI RELATIONS: The Myth of Communist Anti-Fascist Resistance in World War Two, contains a detailed index and a selected bibliography.

The second paper (44 pages), written for and entitled the 20th Anniversary of Hitler's Aggression Against the Soviet Union, (June 22, 1941) is in effect a detailed account of Soviet-Nazi relations during the period 1939-1941. In addition to documentary material on the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939 and the subsequent secret protocols, the paper provides details about the USSR's political and economic assistance to the Nazis and describes the double game played by the Soviets even during the 1939-1941 period.

[You may request either or both
of these historical papers from
headquarters.]


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Significant Dates ▸

JUNE

- 24 Afro-Asian Foreign Ministers Meeting, prelim to II Afro-Asian Conference, heads of state, opening 29 June, Algiers.
- 25 North Korean Army crosses 38th Parallel. 27 June, UN Security Council (USSR boycotting) resolves aid to Republic of Korea; 7 July establishes UN Command, 53 nations endorse assistance, 17 contribute units to UN Force. 1950. Fifteenth anniversary.
- 26 UN charter adopted at conference of 46 nations, in San Francisco 25 April 1945. Twentieth anniversary.
- 28 Rumania bows to USSR's ultimatum, cedes Bessarabia, Bucovina and Hertza District. 1940. Twenty-fifth anniversary.
- 29 Czechoslovakia cedes Ruthenia to USSR. 1945. Twentieth anniversary.

JULY

- 1 Communist Party of China founded. 1921.
- 6 East Germany (Grotewohl) and Poland (Cyrankiewicz) recognize Oder-Neisse line as permanent frontier. 1950. Fifteenth anniversary.
- 7 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) World Congress, Amsterdam, 7-16 July.
- 10 World Congress for Peace, National Independence and General Disarmament, Helsinki, 10-17 July, sponsored by the Communist World Peace Council (WPC) which is working toward the formation of a "united front" of world peace organizations.
- 10 Lavrenti Beria arrest for treason announced. Secretly tried and shot, 18-23 December. 1953.
- 12 Soviet Russia signs treaty with Lithuania recognizing its independence and sovereignty. 1920. (Occupies Lithuania 1940). Forty-fifth anniversary.
- 13 Cuban President Urrutia charges Communism endangers Cuban revolution. Four days later Castro charges Urrutia with treason. 1959.
- 16 Potsdam Conference (16 July-2 August) (Churchill, Attlee, Truman and Stalin) 1945. Twentieth anniversary.
- 18 Big Four "Summit" Conference, Geneva, 18-23 July. France, Great Britain, US and USSR. 1955. Tenth anniversary.
- 25 First World Festival of Youth and Students opens, Prague; sponsored by Communist WFDY and IUS. 1947.
- 27 Ninth World Youth Festival, Algiers, 27 July-6 August.

PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS



#54

Commentary

12-25 May 1965

Principal Developments:

1. Communist statements continue to focus on "U.S. imperialist aggression" in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. Soviet pronouncements are becoming somewhat more militantly and threateningly anti-U.S., -- while Soviet media continue to remain aloof from the infighting within the ICM and repeat their stress on the need for Communist solidarity.
2. The Chinese, however, carry on their running attacks against the Khrushchev revisionists currently leading the CPSU/USSR, with: (a) a detailed account of their allegedly victorious battle against Soviet forces at the 4th AAPSO conference in Ghana (where their main thrust seems to have been directed against Soviet efforts to get themselves included in the forthcoming Algiers Afro-Asian II Conference); (b) a shrill 14 May People's Daily editorial aimed principally against the U.S. but reiterating the Chinese charge of "U.S.-Soviet cooperation for world hegemony"; (c) a hostile commentary on the Shastri visit to Moscow, which revived the Chinese charges of USSR allying itself with India against China; and (d) replay of a major anti-Soviet attack from JCP daily Akahata. Peking publishes the 6th volume of Khrushchev's Statements, but does not report any accompanying "editor's note." The Chinese also publish another report of "brutal suppression" of demonstrating students, -- this time by Yugoslav police against "Latin American, Asian, and African students" in Belgrade! (A minor incident reportedly did occur, but it has not been mentioned by any other media, as far as we know.)
3. The Albanians again lead the Chinese camp in vituperation, with an abusive attack on Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky, and, through him, on Soviet use and misuse of the Warsaw Pact as a captive instrument serving Soviet policy: it culminates in another appeal to the Soviet people to throw out the "usurpers." Also, the Albanians alone report that the 2nd Chinese atom bomb test on 14 May brought "great rejoicing" among their people, -- while other Communist media generally report the event briefly with no comment.
4. The Indonesian CP, holding a CC plenum and staging an elaborate, Sukarno-graced celebration of its 45th anniversary in a posture of "independence and equality," restates policy lines with a strong ChiCom flavor. The arrival of fairly high-level Party delegations from Europe -- USSR, Albania, and Rumania -- as well as from China, Japan, North Korea and North Vietnam, brought Indonesian exultation: such participation testifies to the status of the PKI in the ICM. Party messages on the occasion were rather restrained, paying tribute to the PKI's struggle against modern revisionism (the main danger) and dogmatism.

5. The Pajetta-led Italian CP delegation discussed in preceding issues returns to Rome on completion of its visit to Hanoi, -- without making the relatively little extra effort to participate in the above Indonesian celebration. Visit characterized by expressions of agreement on need for solidarity and of Italian Communist support for the Vietnamese communists: after his return, Pajetta says that Italian volunteers will be ready to go to Vietnam if and when requested. While Pajetta is returning, another PCI delegation headed by L'Unita Director Mario Alicata flies to Havana via Prague, where they hold "cordial talks" with Czech Party leaders.

6. U.S. Embassy in Bucharest reports marked Rumanian interest in Austrian independence and neutrality in international politics, particularly evident in connection with a current Austrian industrial exhibit there. An article in the 13 May issue of foreign affairs weekly Lumea refers positively to "The Austrian Example" of non-identification with military blocs: Embassy sees this as hint of Rumania's discomfort in the Warsaw Pact.

7. A further clandestine report confirms previous indications (#53) that delegations of 16 Western European CPs will meet in Brussels 1-3 June.

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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#54

12-25 May 1965

May 7-24: The Indonesian CP celebrates the 45th anniversary of its founding and holds a CC plenum in May. On the 7th, Party daily Harian Rakjat publishes lengthy "theses" on the 45th anniversary: the brief #29 on the ICM stresses PKI devotion to the "revolutionary principles" of the 1957 and 1960 Moscow documents and "independence and equality in relations among CPs."

"Let us continue to hold aloft the six banners in the struggle against revisionism: (1) the banner of M-L against revisionism; (2) the banner of revolution against capitulationism; (3) the banner of concrete peace against abstract peace; (4) the banner of proletarian internationalism against great nation egoism; (5) the banner of unity against division; and (6) the banner of revolutionary optimism against pessimism."

The PKI plenum, 11-13 May, hears a 7½-hour general report by Chairman Aidit: the limited reporting so far available surprisingly emphasizes his sharp attack on Trotskyism. The plenum's resolution on "Modern Revisionism" says that "the session assessed the developments in the ICM and considers that the fall of N.S. Khrushchev signified the triumph of M-L and the bankruptcy of modern revisionism. However, facts show that modern revisionism without K. still exists and this is proved by the holding of the schismatic meeting in March 1965. By its cunningness and hypocrisy, modern revisionism without Khrushchev today is even more dangerous...."

Medium-high-level Party delegations to the 45th anniversary are reported from the USSR, Albania, and Rumania in Europe, and China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Japan in Asia. Greetings from Mao as well as the North Korean and North Vietnamese Parties congratulate the PKI for its struggle against modern revisionism -- the main danger -- and dogmatism. The CPSU message emphasizes the need for "international solidarity of all ranks of the international revolutionary movement." Harian Rakjat's editorial on the 22nd exults that "the participation in the anniversary celebrations by fraternal parties testified to the status of the PKI in the ICM and to the vitality of proletarian internationalism -- the spirit of M-L." Sukarno's address at the anniversary rally on the 23rd emphasizes his full support of the PKI and the "kom" part of "Nasakom."

May 10-16: The 4th Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference in Winneba (Accra), Ghana, is marked by bitter Sino-Soviet infighting as well as violent anti-U.S. propaganda attacks. NCNA on the 17th publicizes a detailed description of Soviet attempts to manipulate the proceedings and successful Chinese counter-measures.

"The Chinese delegate sternly pointed out at the conference that all these anti-China activities came from one source, the Soviet delegation The schemers failed to disrupt the normal process

(Chronology Cont.)

of the conference They have instead aroused the indignation of many delegates. More serious still was the fact that some people actually tried to make use of the conference to create a climate or a so-called public opinion to help the Soviet Union to force its way into the 2nd Asian-African conference (Algiers). The Indian delegation openly demanded the admission of the Soviet Union to that conference."

"Some people insisted on writing into the declaration of the conference phrases suggesting Soviet participation in the second Asian-African conference Their suggestion, however, was rejected by the conference, and their attempt was foiled. The conference was also challenged with the question should the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity movement continue to work along its own political and organizational lines, or should it submit itself to the foreign policy of a non-Afro-Asian country or to an international organization under its control?"

NCNA reports that the 5th AAPSO conference will be held in Peking in 1967. The general declaration also announces that Latin America would be represented at future meetings and that a separate conference would be held in Havana next January 6, with a preparatory meeting in Cairo September 1. Editorializing on the conference on the 19th, People's Daily says that "in the end, the conspiratorial activities of the splitters and capitulationists met with ignominious failure and the revolutionary line of unity against imperialism won the day." Soviet media report only the conference's strong stand against imperialism.

May 11: The Pajetta-led Italian CP delegation departs from Hanoi after its 11-day "friendship visit." (See Nos. 51, 52, and 53 for earlier reports.) VNA's round-up on the 11th stresses Italian Communist support of North Vietnam and their agreement on the need to "strive persistently for the unity of mind among the international Communist and workers movement on the basis of M-L and proletarian internationalism."

May 13: An Italian CP delegation led by Mario Alicata, Director of L'Unita, flies to Havana from Prague, where they "had a cordial talk" with Czech Party leaders, according to a Prague CTK report on the 14th.

Rumanian foreign affairs weekly Lumea article, "The Austrian Example," refers positively to Austria's example of non-identification with military blocs.

May 14: A shrill People's Daily editorial headed "The Johnson Doctrine Is Neo-Hitlerism" contains a sharp attack on "Khrushchev revisionism":

"The birth of the 'Johnson Doctrine' is closely tied up with the capitulationist line followed by the modern revisionists Neither K himself nor his successors dare to offend U.S. imperialism. K. revisionism is the new doctrine of appeasement of the 60's."

The Chinese 2nd nuclear bomb test on this date draws much the same reaction as the first in September 1964: only the Albanians report "great rejoicing!"

May 15: An Observer article in Pravda, headed "Words and Deeds of the Leaders of the Social Democratic Party of Finland," emphasizes the "vital necessity for the working masses of Finland" of the "cause of unity" and criticizes the "old direction of anti-Communism, distrust, and hostility toward the Soviet Union" of the Social Democrats.

"The alarming fact remains that the SDPF leadership still declares openly and unambiguously their active support for the decisions of the Socialist International on international questions, permeated with the spirit of anti-Communism and solidarity with the policy of the aggressive North Atlantic bloc."

On the previous day, TASS had announced the award of a new Soviet contract to Finland for the construction of 21 tankers at a total cost of 40 million rubles.

May 17: NCNA publicizes and People's Daily reprints text of a 7 May article from Japanese CP daily Akahata entitled "A Refutation of CPSU Leaders' Groundless Charges -- Second Comment on the March Moscow Meeting." PD adds its own banner heading: "CPSU Leaders Reveal Their True Features of Sham Unity and Real Split; the More They Try to Cover Up, the More They Reveal Themselves."

NCNA Peking reports that, "according to news reports from Belgrade," the Yugoslav police brutally suppressed a demonstration against U.S. aggression in the Dominican Republic by "Latin American, Asian, and African students" there. "One demonstrator said that on 12 May about 50 students ... carrying placards ... marched toward the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade.... Yugoslav policemen who blocked the streets brutally beat up the students.... A Colombian student, beaten to unconsciousness by the police, had to be sent to the hospital...."

May 20: NCNA announces publication of the 6th volume of "Khrushchev's Statements": it contains "80 of K's speeches, reports, letters, and cables published from January to June 1957." There is no mention of any "editor's note."

May 21: A long NCNA comment on the 8-day visit of Indian Prime Minister Shastri to Moscow (12-19 May) says that "speeches by both parties during Shastri's visit and the joint communique show that the new Soviet leaders who inherited the mantle of Khrushchev continue to follow the line of vigorously fostering the Indian ruling group and allying with India to oppose China." Although "there was tacit understanding that no critical reference to China and Pakistan be made in the communique," the Soviet leaders "took the lead in applauding" Shastri whenever he "maliciously attacked China" in his speech, which "the Soviet press published in full" and TASS publicized.

May 22: Albanian Zeri I Popullit article, "Reply to Marshal Malinovsky," is slashing attack on Soviet use and misuse of the Warsaw Pact, pegged to Malinovsky's 14 May Moscow speech on the Pact's 10th anniversary, in which he mentioned the "exception" of "Albania, which has isolated itself from other members of the alliance," adding that, "regardless of this fact, the door will always be open to it."

"Marshal Malinovsky is a revisionist demagogue who has more than once proved that he does not blush with shame even when slandering or vulgarly injuring others. (However) ... Historic facts are not tin soldiers which can be arranged or moved at will....

Everyone knows that it is not we who wanted to remain outside the Warsaw Pact, but rather that the Khrushchevite revisionists, particularly N. Khrushchev, Malinovsky, and their comrades now leading the Soviet Union, in an absolute, arbitrary, and illegal manner prevented Albania from exercising its rights as an effective member of the WP and evicted it de facto.... "

ZIP goes on:


"... There no longer exists a Warsaw Pact similar to the one set up by its founders but rather a tool of the revisionist-chauvinist policy of the Soviet leaders....


The Warsaw Pact is dominated by and has had imposed on it the will of a single power, since the Pact is, in fact, directed by the Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Grechko, commander of the united armed forces of the WP countries, is at the same time First Deputy to Malinovsky. General Batov, chief of the General Staff of the Pact armies, is simultaneously First Deputy Chief of the Soviet Army General Staff. Other personnel of the machinery of the Pact armies are, from first to last, members of the Soviet Defense Ministry. Officially, the deputy commanders are the defense ministers of the participating countries, but only in form. They are never asked anything and know nothing of the plans or activities of the leadership of the WP.... Representatives of the armies of the participating countries ... have become simple couriers.... Hence it is you, Marshal Malinovsky, who closed the doors and left Albania outside the WP....


In a perfidious and crude manner, you (Soviet leaders) arbitrarily tore up the bilateral agreements and trampled the obligations.... You pilfered from us eight submarines, as well as Albanian warships which were in Sevastopol for repairs. You dismantled the Vlore base and did your best to weaken the defense camp and Albania.... You made efforts to incite our military against our party and state. After all of these acts of grave treason, splitting, and anti-Marxism, you still have the audacity to accuse Albania of having isolated itself from the Warsaw Pact!

It is not only against Albania and its leaders that you have acted in a sly and perfidious manner. You have behaved cowardly even toward your own men, the eminent staff of the Soviet Army.... Examples exist in the hundred and thousands. Here we will recall just one which clearly typifies the plots and putsches hatched by Khrushchev, Malinovsky, and their colleagues whom we now find at the head of the Soviet party and state. To rid yourselves of Marshal Zhukov, ... you plotted against him.... In his place, the revisionist group designated Marshal Malinovsky, collaborator of long standing and faithful tool of Khrushchev. Zhukov, that remarkable Soviet military leader and one of the most eminent Soviet Army officers during the great patriotic war, whose name was respected and honored through the world, was accused in a cowardly manner by the K. group.... Zhukov's eviction was the signal for sacking thousands of army officers and appointing to leading army organizations elements loyal to the K. revisionist line.


...We are certain that the Soviet people will not tolerate for long charlatans and liars who have usurped the command posts of the Soviet Army and state....!"








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U.S. course in Vietnam was for policy...


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
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
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



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
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




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
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


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
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





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





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
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
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



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








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7 June 1965

"The Soviet Chekists in the Great Fatherland War"

Moscow PRAVDA 7 May 1965 -- A

(Article by Chairman of the State Security Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers V. Semichastny)

(Text) Twenty years ago the heroic Soviet people and their noble armed forces under the leadership of the Communist Party achieved a world-historic victory over fascist Germany. Our people courageously defended the achievements of socialism and protected the freedom and independence of their homeland. The fighting men of the army, air force, and navy and the Soviet partisans displayed unrivaled courage, firmness, military mastery, and boldness in battle. Thanks to the selfless labor of the workers class and kolkhoz peasantry, the Soviet intelligentsia, our youth, and the Soviet women, our front and our rear areas obtained everything needed to crush the enemy.

The armed struggle on the fronts of the Great Fatherland War was the main form of the struggle between the Soviet Union and fascist Germany but not the only one. Together with the open armed struggle, a fierce secret war was waged, the scale and degree of tension of which were unprecedented in history. The war was an unprecedented test for Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence. The Soviet Chekists contributed many efforts and much inventiveness to routing fascism and, with the support of all the people, they won the fierce battle on the invisible front of struggle against the intelligence services of the Hitlerite coalition.

Fascist Germany's military and political leadership set very wide and far-reaching tasks for its intelligence and counterintelligence organs. Even before the beginning of the war they were assigned to collecting exhaustive intelligence data about the military potential of the Soviet Union, and also to preparing, from the intelligence point of view, the carrying out of the first operations aimed at routing the Red Army. After the beginning of military operations the fascist German agents were to continuously supply the military command with information about Soviet troops and the work of Soviet industry and transport. In addition to this, Hitler's organs of secret war aimed at demoralizing our rear through mass diversion activities and through organizing mutinous actions, sabotage, terror, and defeatist agitation, and thus undermine the combat capability of the Soviet front troops.

According to available information, to achieve these aims the Hitlerites concentrated more than 130 intelligence and counterintelligence organs on the Soviet-German front and set up about 60 special schools for training agents. Hitler's generals hoped that this would enable them to base their perfidious attack on an accurate knowledge of the Soviet Union's military-industrial and political potential. But in the war against the Soviet Union the fascist espionage strategy was utterly defeated. The hopes placed by the Hitlerites in a "fifth column" in the "weakness"

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of the rear, in the "cracks" in our social and state system collapsed like a house of cards. All designs of the German fascist agents failed before the strong moral-political unity of the Soviet people, their ardent love of their homeland, their high revolutionary vigilance, and the courage and firmness of the Soviet Chekists.

We know that the period of the personality cult was connected with serious distortions and errors in the work of the organs of state security. Yet we also know that these errors did not change the socialist nature of Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence and that they did not separate it from the party and the people. It was precisely the close links of the overwhelming majority of the Chekists with the people that created those conditions which in the final analysis predetermined their victory over the intelligence of fascist Germany.

The reorganization of the work of the state security organs in tune with military requirements took place under the direct leadership of the party. In a directive dated 29 June 1941 the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars obliged the Chekists to give comprehensive assistance to the army in crushing Hitler's Germany, to intensify the protection of the rear areas against the enemy's subversive activities, and to decisively destroy spies, diversionists, and parachutists. A special directive formulated the tasks of the state security organs relating to organizing the struggle in the enemy's rear areas. From the beginning of the war the influence exerted on the military counterintelligence organs by the military front and army councils increased.

The state security organs set up a tight, reliable screen against the enemy's penetration into the vitally important centers of our country, into key points of the national economy, first and foremost into those branches in industry which were directly working for the requirements of the war. The rear of our armed forces was under the reliable guard of the Chekists.

In the zone of military operations itself, the task of protecting the Red Army against the agents of the adversary was entrusted to the organs of military counterintelligence. In spite of great difficulties, the special section coped successfully with that task. A harmonious system of struggle against spies and diversionists was created in the zone of the fronts. The operative plans and intentions of our command were carefully protected against the enemy. The enemy did not succeed in obtaining one single plan of defensive operations of our forces in the years of the Great Fatherland War. The Soviet Chekists, operating in close contact with the army staffs, systematically provided the enemy with wrong information on the plans of the Soviet command on the movement of troops, and on the situation in the rear areas. This contributed toward shifting considerable enemy forces to areas which were favorable for the Soviet command and also toward sudden advance operations being carried out by the Soviet troops.

The border and internal troops covered themselves with unwaning glory in the struggle for the homeland. The border guards were the first to absorb the sudden blow of the enemy and they fought for every inch of Soviet territory with unparalleled steadfastness and gallantry. Here is a brilliant example of patriotism and faithfulness to duty: Not a single border guard detail withdrew from the border without orders. The enemy could spread the border cordons with fire, he could encircle and destroy small border guard garrisons, but he did not succeed in forcing them to surrender. Units of the border and internal troops, which guarded the rear of the operative army, waged a selfless struggle against the enemy's subversive activities. Along the entire length of those borders which were not included in the zone of combat operations the Chekists mounted combat guard duty, cutting off all attempts of the enemy agents to penetrate into Soviet territory.

Special communications troops were successfully operating on the fronts of the Fatherland War. Under the complicated conditions in combat situations the members of the state security communication organs insured reliable covered communications for the leaders of the party and the government, and the staff of the Supreme Command with the fronts and armies, and they successfully cut off the attempts of the enemy diversionists to interrupt communications.

The feats of Soviet intelligence men operating in the rear of the fascist Germany army will remain forever in the glorious history of our victory. Thousands of patriots in areas temporarily occupied by the enemy, as well as on the latter's territory itself, were conducting intelligence and diversionist work during the years of the war. They were supplying our army with important information concerning the location and movements of the forces of the enemy, concerning the latter's operational plans. Thus, in 1942 Chekists obtained a number of important documents characterizing the situation among Hitler's forces and staffs. In the spring of 1943, information was collected concerning the transfer of enemy infantry and tank divisions from Europe and Africa in the direction of Kursk, and concerning the preparations for a large offensive of the fascist troops in that area. Operating in the rear of the enemy the Chekists infiltrated its intelligence and counterintelligence organs and exposed enemy agents trained to be dropped in our rear areas. The operative groups of the Belorussian Chekists alone detected in the rear of the enemy 22 intelligence division schools of the "Abwehr" and also a large number of local and other agents.

The Chekists actively assisted the party organizations in developing the partisan movement and in carrying out diversions in the rear of the enemy. The names of glorified Chekists D.N. Medvedev, S.A. Vaupshasov, and others who were commanding partisan units are now far beyond the borders of the homeland.

The Soviet Chekists took part in the "war on rails" and carried out bold attacks against the headquarters of the enemy and objectives in the rear areas. They derailed hundreds of railroad echelons and destroyed quite

a few German fascist occupiers. As a result of diversionary blows against important enemy objectives, the Chekist diversion groups seriously hampered the activities of the enemy rear organizations and frequently wrecked the movement of troops and combat equipment.

The Great Fatherland War tested the ability of Soviet state security organs to wage a struggle against the subversive activities of an experienced and perfidious enemy--activities which were unprecedented in their scope and cruelty. Here the courage and steadfastness of the Soviet Chekists were put to the test. The war showed that the overwhelming majority of the Chekists passed these tests with honor. They were ardent patriots of their motherland; they were honest and brave men who were devoted to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Just as all other Soviet people, they displayed mass heroism and self-sacrifice. Our people will cherish the memory of hero Chekists V.A. Molodtsov, V.A. Lyagin, N.I. Kuznetsov, G.M. Kravtsov, F.F. Ozmitel, and B.L. Galushkin, and of hero border guards A.V. Lopatin, I.K. Golubets, S.S. Pustelnikov, and others, who gave their lives for the freedom of the Soviet motherland. The Soviet people pay deep respect to the heroic exploits of Chekists and border guards K.P. Orlovskiy, P.I. Derzhavin, N.F. Kaymanov, Ye.I. Mikovskiy, M.I. Naumov, A.M. Rabtsevich, and many others.

On the eve of the great holiday of victory we cannot but also express our special appreciation and profound gratitude to the courageous Soviet intelligence agents who, just like Hero of the Soviet Union Richard Sorge or like the intelligence agent known under the name of Rudolf Abel, implemented the difficult but honorable task of struggling against the enemy.

Their efforts were truly selfless, efforts which demanded great spiritual exertions, courage, and determination, and boundless love and devotion to the homeland.

The time has not yet come to give the names of all those fearless men, but history will require them with all the good things they have justly deserved. For it is precisely to their selflessness and to their exerting service under complicated conditions--far from their homeland, their families and friends--that we owe the fact that the perfidious plans of Hitler's Germany were exposed, plans directed not only against the Soviet Union but also against other peoples who were part of the anti-Hitlerite coalition.

The 20th anniversary of the victory over fascism is celebrated by our people under conditions in which the forces of peace and socialism are constantly becoming stronger. Against these forces imperialism is attempting to oppose an unrestrained armaments race, indulgence of the ideas of revanchism, and the fanning of hotbeds of war in various areas of the globe.

The contemporary period is characterized by an activation of the subversive activities of imperialism, which is headed by the aggressive circles in the United States, for the purpose of paralyzing the defensive capability of the USSR and the other socialist countries, introducing a rift within their ranks, dividing the anti-imperialist forces, and disintegrating them from within.

In guiding all the practical activities of the state security organs, the Communist Party Central Committee and the Soviet Government direct the attention of the Chekists to the necessity of constantly increasing their political vigilance, promptly detecting the perfidious designs of the imperialists, and cutting off the subversive activities of the enemy intelligence services. In solving these tasks the state security organs are aiming their basic activities at the outside, against the agents of the imperialist intelligence agencies. The Chekists are unrelentingly guarding the interests of the Soviet people, taking every measure to keep them secure against the designs of our adversaries from the camp of imperialism.

A guarantee for the successful solution of the tasks assigned to them consists in the fact that the entire activity of the state security organs is based on Leninist principles. This activity is imbued with a spirit of lofty partymindedness, of unrelenting striving for perfecting the methods of Chekist work, of creatively developing the experience that has been gathered in the struggle against the enemies of the motherland. It is imbued with the spirit of comprehensively strengthening and expanding the links with the people, of continuing to strengthen socialist legality and the strict observation of the Leninist norms of party and state life.

7 June 1965

French Views of De Gaulle's Policies

In November 1964 an 18,000-word treatise titled "French Science, Technology, and Industry Vis-A-Vis the Nuclear Deterrent Force," by Nicolas Vichney, was presented serially in the Paris daily Le Monde (Issues of 28 Nov to 1 Dec). The body of the article dealt in some depth with how the French Government had had to compromise other interests and borrow heavily from the industries and technology of allies to achieve even a nominal capacity to produce atomic weapons. The final conclusions of the treatise were as follows:

"In Conclusion: However incomplete this survey may be it makes it possible to acquire a general idea of the consequences of the creation of the deterrent force on technology and on the electronic industry.

Of course, this analysis had to stop in front of military and industrial secrets, and it is possible that here or there technicians may have invented new uses for the specialized equipment which they are in charge of manufacturing. This analysis has undoubtedly also shown that in some sectors the orders given may have a good influence on other military or civilian realizations.

But it does seem certain that the progress which is being or will be made thus affects only very limited sectors of technology and that it is far from causing great upsets in them. We can also ascertain that the equipment ordered strictly speaking for the deterrent force is not of such a nature as to truly help the development of studies in those sectors of French electronic technology which are most in need of being stimulated: transistors, integrated circuits, computers, and lasers.

In order to promote these studies it would be necessary to launch extensive, even very extensive, research and development programs; and the way in which we in France have set up the deterrent force does not provide for such projects within the framework of the effort planned.

Be this regrettable or not, the fact is that military contracts play the part of stimulants in technology and in the electronics industry: either by providing markets which allow the study of new equipment or by providing orders the profit from which can serve in part to finance studies. We are undoubtedly witnessing a growing divergence between military and civilian equipment, but it is always possible to believe that the progress made by the first can benefit the second by osmosis....

While the deterrent force does not provide French industry with orders which open up new prospects for the future, has the French

Emphasis added throughout. Ed.

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electronic industry at least benefited from substantial markets which allow it to strengthen its research effort? This does not seem to be the case. Indeed:

the necessity of making funds available for strategic weapons led to a reduction of orders concerning conventional armaments;

the very nature of the realizations which must be carried out in order to create the deterrent force makes the role of electronics a minor one.

Thus everyone recognizes that the total volume of military contracts with the electronic industry has decreased considerably. In order to evaluate this situation correctly it is necessary to take into consideration two factors:

orders concerning strategic weapons present the following advantage for the industrialist: they are not often renegotiated as was too often the case for certain military markets. One no longer moves on from one program to another according to technical progress or to the evolution of ideas concerning defense. Now one installs a system of weapons and then thinks about what refinements and what improvements one could carry out. The industrialist who was all too accustomed to the cancellation of contracts receives the benefits of a certain stability due to the manufacture of strategic weapons.

For the technician on the other hand the start up of this same production was accompanied by the disappearance of certain markets which had been handed to him in order to make it possible for him to prepare himself for what are believed to be tomorrow's achievements. Thus the prospect of continuing to carry out the present work connected with strategic weapons is far from reassuring to him, it does not satisfy him because all he sees in it is assurance of further specific technologic developments.

The fact is that the resources which can be mobilized in France -- financial resources, human resources -- are still limited, and that when they are invested in one undertaking which leads only to specific isolated results it becomes impossible to stimulate other undertakings. Thus we are led to believe that it is as yet impossible for us to carry out simultaneously a policy favoring strategic armaments and a sustained policy leading to an expansion of electronic technology.

This study has ignored some sectors which are equally affected by the creation of the deterrent force, such as the sector of structural materials for the construction of ballistic missiles, but a detailed study of these does not seem to alter our data. At the end of our study let us attempt to formulate a conclusion. Three points are worth emphasizing:

French science, technology, and industry can derive some direct or indirect advantages from the realization of the deterrent force such as

it has been conceived. Except for the sector of the atom, in which a part of the efforts undertaken has led to the creation of a French nuclear industry, these advantages seem to be limited to narrow fields;

these advantages -- always excluding those which benefited the French industry involved in the construction of atomic power plants -- are way out of proportion with the magnitude of the means required by the creation of this deterrent force;

it is not impossible that the size of the credits allocated to strategic weapons has actually handicapped the launching of programs which could have fostered the development of French technology in some noteworthy sectors such as the sector of computers.

The mistake made by some people consists in attempting to justify an undertaking the aim of which is essentially political and military with an additional argument which is in no way related to politics nor, in its strictest sense, to national defense.

Either the 'striking force' within the framework of its mission is harmful, useless, or insufficient; or -- always remaining within the limits of our resources -- it answers an undeniable need. In any case, is it really necessary, in order to make it seem less burdensome, to attribute to it the role of an irreplaceable factor of progress without having evaluated it first?"

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Following is a translation of an article in the 2 Dec 64 Le Monde, reporting a press conference chaired by National Assembly Deputy Jules Moch. The gist of this article is that the government's nuclear armaments program is a hindrance to France's social and economic future, with no commensurate political or military advantages.

"On the eve of the parliamentary debate concerning the military program-law the national committee against the striking force and for general disarmament held, on Monday in Paris, a press conference chaired by Mr. Jules Moch, surrounded among others by Mr. François Billoux, Mr. Claude Bourdet, and Mr. Gerard Jacquet.

'To defend the striking force' said Mr. Moch 'means not only to attribute to the concept of national greatness a meaning inherited from the conquerors of old, but also to sacrifice -- within the framework of the budgetary balance -- a sum equal to the cost of this force which could be spent on socially useful and economically productive works.'

When speaking of the first program-law, which went from 1960 to 1964, the speaker estimated that the allocations of 6 billions which had been foreseen had doubled, and that of these 12 billions eight had been paid out and four were still due. While he believes that these 'over-expenditures' occurred everywhere he thinks that the most considerable

ones occurred in connection with the Mirage IV airplane and with the Pierrelatte plant. He declared: 'The strategic airplanes, which as the minister of defense himself today recognizes will no longer be able to penetrate improved air defenses in 1968, ... will all the same have cost -- for 62 airplanes and their subsidiaries -- according to different program-laws a total of 4,7000 millions, i.e. 75 millions per airplane instead of 20 as per the 1960 estimate.'

As for Pierrelatte the former minister estimates at 2 billions the cost of the new installations which, according to him, will cost 'three times as much before it will be possible to start them up.'

Then, adding up the two program-laws, Mr. Moch asserted that with this total of 46.25 billions 'which we are asked to pay in eleven years for the striking force alone' it would have been possible to build one million HLM dwellings, or 6,000 kilometers of highway, or 3,000 lycees and ten universities, or 40,000 swimming pools

In view of the fact that eight billions of payment credits have been allocated to the striking force between 1960 and 1964, and that 4.8 billions are included in the 1965 budget, there would be 33 billions left over to spend by 1970. Mr. Moch noted that the second program-law only foresees 22 billions. 'A comparison between the totals' said Mr. Moch 'leads us to the conclusion that there will either be 11 billions of non settled bills in 1970, or that the payments between 1966 and 1970 will be 50% larger than those recorded in the law of finances and will no longer reach an average of 4 to 5 billions per year, but an average of 6 to 7 billions.'

Then Mr. Moch discussed atomically propelled submarines and made a comparison between the credits allocated for them and the cost of similar American submarines, and he concluded that by 1970 France will be able to have one submarine and begin construction of a second one but will not have been able to build three of them as foreseen.

As for the two or three dozens SSBS [sol-sol balistique strategique; ground-to-ground ballistic strategic] missiles, the former minister believes that 'this concept may be valid if, like the United States, one will by 1970 have about 800 launching silos available. To plan to build 20 or 30 of them is to provoke a catastrophe.'

Analyzing the armament which France will have in 1970, and which according to him will consist of 62 strategic airplanes 'antiquated since 1968', of a first atomically propelled submarine, and 'perhaps' of a few strategic rockets and of some fissionable material 'equivalent to a tonnage inferior to one hundredth of what exists in the United States or in the USSR,' Mr. Moch also stated that this armament would ensure neither the safety nor the defense of our country and that 'the only aim of our striking force which stands up under analysis is the desire of carrying weight with our allies.'

And he concluded: 'Ineffective as far as our security, financially ruinous, economically a cause of inflation and of industrial delays, uninteresting for scientific research which it limits and hampers more than it develops it, our striking force greatly handicaps our future.'

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Following is a translation of an article in the 4 Dec 64 Le Monde, reporting a speech in parliament by National Assembly Deputy Francois Mitterand. While M. Mitterand is anything but pro-American, he obviously and nonetheless can see no advantage for the West or France in Gaullist anti-Americanism.

"For M. Mitterand (Rassemblement Democratique), parliament is not obliged to choose between the multilateral force and a national strategic nuclear force, in other words, between two bad solutions. As for the program project, it will not permit reaching the 'threshold of effectiveness.' In effect, 'absolute deterrence is not achieved when the eventual aggressor knows that, while we are able to cause him partial damage, he can himself destroy us entirely. It is not achieved if he knows that France is not ready to go to the full limit of its program. Nor is it achieved if he knows that France has neglected to take suitable steps to assure the survival of the French population.'

In no part of the program do we see written expenditures which would permit assuring their protection and which would guarantee us that the national defense will be employed with good sense.'

Since 1958 budgetary credits for civilian protection have not exceeded 130 millions per year. In February 1962 M. Debre, then prime minister, signed instructions in which we could read: 'If the nation is not properly safeguarded with civilian protection, all the defense efforts lose significance.'

The government refuses the required credits because it is afraid to present to the French the true picture of its military policy.

Interrupted by M. Sanguinetti (UNR), the reporter for the Committee for National Defense, then by General Cherasse (UNR), deputy from the Nièvre, sustained by M. Bosson (Center dem.), he recalled that the reporter on the internal budget, M. Charret (UNR) recently pointed out that credits for civilian protection fell from 6,300,000 francs in 1964 to 2,700,000 francs for 1965 and this at the very moment when we are making the atomic bomb. Then he took up his attack again and addressing himself to M. Pompidou, declared, 'The truth is that you do not believe in your own arguments. And if you do not believe in them, why do you expect the eventual aggressor to believe in them more than you do?...''

Listening to the chief of state bring up at Strasbourg the creation of a Europe for Europeans, independent and capable of defending itself, I could not help but think of Racine:

'An oracle always delights in concealing
Always with the import that another is to come.'

How could parliament pursue the examination of this legislative program without knowing what foreign and European policies the chief of state and the government are preparing to propose to it?

General de Gaulle gives so many definitions, sometimes contradictory ones, of Europe that it becomes difficult to imagine what his position will be tomorrow. The observations he made not long ago on integration exclude his proposing to us an integrated Europe. For him, the French-German union could only be a 'tight-rope walking trick' -- but that was on 11 February 1952: the coal and steel pool was only a pretense -- but that was in 1951: France could not enter into the European confederation except with the French Union -- but that was a long time ago! Finally, he always held that Europe will only arise if France emerges as its head. That was in 1950...

The European policy which members of the majority speak about is for them only an alibi. They well know that France alone cannot assure her security. But having repudiated every form of an Atlantic Community Organization, they turn, without knowing too well where they are going, towards those European countries which they have rejected, ridiculed, and alienated.

We think that the security of France rests on international unity and arbitration. We think that greatness resides in fidelity to a certain concept of the world and of man. We believe that the greatness of France consists in refusing to confound love of country with the insolence of national egotism.

Gentlemen of the government, France should refuse your policy which, from challenge to challenge, from ultimatum to ultimatum, pushes the abominable and imbecilic wheel of history along roads which the West already knows.

Which, by its competition, its caprices, its policy of alliances, its miserable intrigue, its captains of adventure, the melancholy skepticism of its diplomats, its juvenile dreams, its obstinacies of old men, has ended up by killing its most beautiful hopes and by shaking the foundations of its civilization, mother of the new world. The opposition is perhaps divided on its concepts of Europe, but it is united by the idea that the security of France is not based on the prestige of one man of Providence, nor on the capacity of destruction of his magic bomb...

It is in Europe, at the United Nations, at the Disarmament Conference of Geneva that France would have been able to give a universal radiance to its policy. But the foreign policy of the government rests on the principle of another century. The members of the majority imagine

that they are delivering a great message, they are only giving expression to old nationalistic refrains of yesterday. The reporter for the committee on national defense has made 'the will of force' a basis for the policy of states. We refuse to have the policy of France rest on what is not an act of confidence but a gesture of despair."

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Following is translation of an editorial on the bomb in the 2 Dec 64 Le Monde, signed "Sirius."

"Even before the end of the Algerian war the thermonuclear bomb seemed to be the principal concern of the President of the Republic. If there were any need of proof the urgency demanded for the discussion and the vote in favor of the program-law which set for six years the orientation of national defense and the obligations which it implies, would be sufficient to indicate clearly that the true 'priority of priorities' does indeed work in its favor. Thus French internal as well as foreign policies are organized around the bomb which thereby rules over the future of our country. This is a serious and complex question and Le Monde has attempted to illustrate its different aspects, aside from any propaganda. Even if the course already seems to have been set could we, on the eve of an important decision, express a few thoughts?

No one will deny that in the intellectually and morally backward condition of our planet the bomb is an element of prestige and hence of political influence. This can easily be seen in the case of France, and is even more clearly proven by the case of China.

In matters concerning France the strategic value of the bomb and the efficacy of its deterrent force seem much more debatable. It is true that Americans and Russians have a power to destroy, an 'overkill' power, which, if one may say, is far greater than what is required. It is also true that a much more limited armament is still frightening. Yet one must watch out not to push too far the theory of relative deterrence. It may be true that the threat of one or two bombs -- with a destructive power equal to one million tons of TNT -- could cause a possible aggressor to hesitate; but it is not true, as it has been said and written, that thus Denmark could balance the Soviet Union, or Switzerland China. The size of the territory and the dispersion of the population, the industrial power of the country, remain decisive factors.

Today, with its small stock of A bombs, and even more so in a few years with the hydrogen bomb, France could exert a certain deterrent power. But this result of psychological warfare can be obtained only under a twofold condition: the enemy must be persuaded of the fact that these bombs can reach their target and that the authority in charge would not hesitate to issue the fatal order. One can have doubts concerning both these points.

Who can guarantee that at first the Mirage IV would be sure to reach their destination? And if this were possible who in France would decide to destroy immediately several million innocent people if, for instance, the Red Army were to seize Berlin? And to do this with the certainty that within the next few minutes our small country would all be prey to atomic destruction. Thus, whatever we may do, the enemy will always have some good reasons not to feel radically deterred; and the Germans will always have good reasons to think that if the United States may hesitate to risk its national 'sanctuary' for the defense of western Europe, France, notwithstanding its proximity and partly because of it, would have even greater reasons to abstain or to wait.

Uncertain and dangerous because it is capable of attracting the lightning which it is supposed to neutralize, the bomb could very well exert ravages in France without ever exploding. Nicolas Vichney has recently shown here ([Note]: See Le Monde, 28, 29-30 November, and 1 December 1964) that the development of nuclear armament was of very little use to true scientific research. Knowledgeable scientists even state that it tends to sterilize scientific research. On the industrial and technological level some good results are undeniable: be it a matter of alloys, of the vacuum industry, or of electronics. And yet we must recognize that the 'atomic quality' is not often useful in ordinary life and military authorities achieve it only at the cost of tremendous waste. To this people answer, not without reason, that like war itself the preparations for war are wasteful by nature, but that they so far remain the easiest way of mobilizing energies and capitals. In other words it is very easy to imagine other ways of increasing profit from these capitals and these energies, but there would then be a great risk that the required effort would never be made.

Even if we regretfully accept the situation there are limits which must not be surpassed. It is often said in France that the savings of personnel, as compared to the army of old, easily make up for the expenditures caused by establishing and operating the modern army. This is only true at first. Judging by the experience acquired during these last years the figures set by the program-law can only be considered as a foundation and no one can honestly figure out how high they can go. What is sure is that the thesis which had briefly been adopted, i.e. that the big bomb would make large battalions useless, soon had to be abandoned.

It has been necessary to recognize that far from abolishing them the bomb required the creation of highly mechanized costly intervention divisions which have to be richly endowed with so-called classical weapons as well as with so-called tactical nuclear weapons. On top of this there is the organization of the defense of the national territory (DOT) against local action which may or may not originate from abroad. Without mentioning the protection of the population which, so far, has not even been outlined. Thus one ascertains that a sovereign defense can be carried out only over very vast territories with a free use of what those who joke with a straight face have called the complete panoply of modern weapons.

Great Britain which, with the help of the war, had profited a great deal from research done in the United States found itself obliged to give up this race, even before the return to power of the Labourites. What chance do we have of succeeding better than they did?

The problems which dominate the future of the world are those raised by Germany's accelerated rearmament and desire for reunification, by the spread of nuclear weapons, by the ever growing -- with few exceptions -- gap between living conditions in the more homogeneous over-industrialized temperate regions of the northern hemisphere and those of the underdeveloped, underfed south. Far from helping to solve these problems the French bomb can only aggravate them. To proclaim that nuclear weapons are the 'sine qua non' condition of sovereignty and independence means to nurture and to legitimize the ambition of many States, among which first of all Germany, it means to give absolute priority to military enterprises, it means to further complicate international disarmament efforts, it may also mean to ruin by internal erosion the basic elements of what one pretends to conserve and to defend.

However fearsome it may be the balance of terror is a fact; a fact which, except for unforeseen changes, is at the basis of peaceful co-existence since, according to General Ailleret's formula, it remains 'the best guarantee of the elimination of foreign wars as policy tools,' and thus it somehow announces this world government which is along the lines of the human future.

The French plutonium bomb is also a fact. It represents a prestige value and perhaps certain operational possibilities of such a nature as to give it a very relative retaliatory and therefore deterrent power. Is a 'small bomb,' 15 to 20 times more powerful than the one which destroyed Hiroshima, really so unworthy of our pride and of our claims for anyone who accepts the unacceptable anti-city strategy -- since our means do not allow us an anti- [armed] forces strategy?

It is too late for the common expenditure enterprise which had been envisaged under the 4th Republic, but we are still in time to give up the construction of the 'upper' and of the 'uppermost' Pierrelatte plants and the production of tritium; to put an end to the mad expenditures engaged at the antipodes; to recognize that -- notwithstanding our efforts -- first rate power, unconditional sovereignty and defense can no longer exist on our level. Instead of insisting on going it alone and thereby adding to the disorder, it would be better for us to contribute -- just as firmly and more modestly -- to a European-Atlantic organization the working rules of which would have to be defined. A very broad French policy aimed at long range agreements from the Atlantic to the Urals would be fostered by this, not paralyzed.

He who wants to win all runs a serious risk of losing all. May the elected representatives of the nation, when they weigh their responsibilities, remember that for better or for worse they too are France."

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Following is translation of an article, "The Myth and Reality of French Military Policy," by the noted French commentator, Raymond Aron, which appeared in the Paris daily Le Figaro on 3 Dec 64.

"The parliamentary debate concerning the second military program-law could not turn out to be surprising.

The first reason for this is the fact that national defense is obviously part of the 'reserved domaine.' Mr. Pompidou's and Mr. Messmer's opinions are not without interest, but we would prefer to know what the Chief of State thinks. General de Gaulle never went beyond simple statements (for instance the need for a purely French defense) which may be sufficient to justify the decisions reached, but which do not reveal his ultimate intentions.

Most of the arguments for or against the national deterrent force have many times been voiced: in the Assembly, in the press, in books. It would be useless to renew a discussion which is growing increasingly academic since the enterprise is basically irreversible. A different regime or a different government might make a different diplomatic use of the strategic force, it would not give up the idea of building the latter.

From certain points of view the controversy is so technical (for instance: what profit does the ensemble of French industry derive from the expenditures allocated to the strategic force?) that on both sides the discussion is carried out by experts, scientists or engineers, who express themselves through politicians.

Finally the program-law illustrates one of the original aspects of the government of modern societies: one decides in 1964 what will be in 1973. Indeed it is then that the three submarines, each armed with sixteen Polaris type rockets, are supposed to be in use. The ground-to-ground medium range rockets are supposed to be ready at some time in between the Mirage IV and the atomic submarines so as to avoid a situation whereby in 1969, at the time of the renewal of the Atlantic Pact, the deterrent force of the first generation would already be antiquated and the sea-to-ground missiles would not yet be available. A military policy conceived to last for about ten years entails not only scientific and financial but also diplomatic guesswork. Any appraisal of the respective merits of the policy which has been chosen or of those of another policy which could have been conceivable depends on the worldwide conjuncture in 1970 or in 1975 of which no one can be sure today.

The French national defense budget, such as it has been presented to the Assembly, considered as a percent of the national product is no larger than that of Great Britain or of the Federal Republic of Germany. Calculated this way, according to official figures, it would even be lower than that of the two main European members of NATO (providing the French national product continues to advance at the same pace as during

these last years). Thus the choice affects less the volume of expenditures than the subdivision of expenditures among different uses: nuclear force, intervention divisions, operational defense of the territory. The aim is to reduce to 50% of the total the part of the budget devoted to operating expenditures. Among investments or armaments -- about 10 billion francs a year -- the nuclear force will continue to have priority. By 1970 it will be possible to modernize two or three divisions at most. The army and the navy will be reduced to a minimum so that France thanks to the Mirage IV, to the ground-to-ground rockets, and to the submarines may recover full and complete independence of its national defense, at least in theory.

I would neither like to approve nor to criticize this policy, I would like to bring out its true significance which has little in common with official speeches. The territory of the Federal Republic on which American and German divisions are stationed stretches between the only power endowed with nuclear weapons whose aggression could be feared and the borders of France. This makes it possible for France to do without divisions equipped with classical weapons. It is not, as a certain deputy of the majority has said, because the absence of classical means makes the threat of having recourse to atomic weapons more believable, but because our allies shield us. Even if France tomorrow were to leave the Atlantic Alliance officially, it would still be protected by the American-German army.

People will say that the strategic force guarantees us from blackmail or from atomic aggression. But here too, whatever our diplomatic actions may be, the thermonuclear power of the United States is the one which exerts the deterrent action. When Mr. Messmer declares that at the slightest aggression a French government worthy of this name would not hesitate to use atomic retaliation, he scares no one, not even the Frenchmen whose death a government 'worthy of this name' would cause if it were to give the fatal order. First of all under present circumstances the risk of Soviet aggression does not exist. Furthermore, supposing circumstances would change, the Soviet leaders would still tomorrow be deterred by the thermonuclear apparatus of the United States, at least as long as the presence of American troops on the old continent gives proof of a commitment which French 'experts' can pretend to doubt, but which the men in the Kremlin very wisely take seriously.

Shall one say that the French government could unleash the lightning while the American leaders would hesitate to do it? In these terms the question is poorly formulated. If aggression were to take place use of the French strategic force would mean destruction of this country. What must be proven is that the French threat of unleashing atomic retaliation, even without American agreement, will keep the enemy from undertaking initiatives which the power of the United States would not have been enough to prevent. The French force may well represent an additional factor of uncertainty for the presumed aggressor. But many years will go by before the French force can replace the American force. Hence the

efforts of the Federal Republic of Germany to tighten the ties between some Europeans and the United States -- at a time when French diplomacy could wrongly create the impression that it is trying to loosen these ties -- are consonant with French interests.

I do mean 'wrongly.' General de Gaulle is well aware of the fact that French security is dependent on American power, but in view of his concept of relations between States he sees no reason for paying for what the circumstances lead the United States to give him for free. Under the present circumstances the national nuclear force does not correspond to a military necessity; but it is a diplomatic tool the value of which may not be negligible. Even the doctrine of massive retaliation on which the spokesmen of the majority like to expound with touching oversimplifications acquires meaning as soon as one no longer takes into consideration the possibility of having to apply it.

Once one admits that there is no danger of war, and that some of our allies do have classical weapons while others do have the elements of a deterrent force, the military policy of France, interpreted in strictly diplomatic terms, can very well be justified.

Unfortunately I do not believe that this interpretation, which seems so obvious to me, is accepted either by the majority or by the opposition."

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Following is translation of a second article by Raymond Aron in Le Figaro on 7 Dec 64. He puts in the record that whereas he (like Mitterand) is far from totally agreeing with U.S. and British strategic concepts, he sees Gaullist policies and priorities as "nonsensical."

"Friends have reproached me for not having given a yes or a no answer to the question which the military program-law raised for each citizen, not only for the deputies. I do not believe that I tend towards conformism, nor that I can be suspected of prudence as far as the princes who govern us are concerned. The reasons for which I had interpreted governmental policies without approving or disapproving them seemed and still seem valid to me: The complexity of the problem, the many scientific and diplomatic uncertainties of a long range plan, the lack of certainty concerning the ultimate intentions of the man who, alone, makes decisions. I have however been receptive to the objection that in the last analysis citizens as well as parliamentarians must take a position for or against.

I have always been in favor of a French atomic program. When some 'Europeans' wished to insert in the Euratom treaty a clause forbidding

any member country the military uses of atomic energy I fought such an abdication as hard as I could. I have always believed it to be unacceptable to leave the scientific and strategic monopoly of nuclear weapons in the hands of the Americans and of the British. In 1960-1961 I tried in vain to convince those who were to become President Kennedy's advisers of this, and I foretold them the deterioration of Franco-American relations which would result from a treaty suspending nuclear tests or from any measure which, under the pretext of preventing the spread of atomic weapons, would seem to want to prevent France from doing what Britain had been allowed to do, what it had even been helped to do. The only way of getting the American leaders to change their attitude was to agree to the expenditures necessary to manufacture the bombs and prove our scientific and technological capability with action.

Notwithstanding this agreement in principle I would have, without hesitation, voted against the military program-law, because of the diplomacy of which it is part and because of the official justifications given.

Sometimes the French strategic force is presented as purely national, sometimes as European, it varies with the time and the spokesman. The prime minister himself, in a pertinent fashion, said that Great Britain was more concerned with maintaining its special ties with the United States than with co-operating with the countries of the continent. He also pointed out that the atomic rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany entails risks in view of the fact that the Soviet Union is so strongly opposed to it. Under the present circumstances -- and this remark is just as valid against some members of the opposition -- none of the conditions necessary for a European force has been fulfilled. Therefore to suggest that the French force alone within a few years will ensure the safety of our country, or that it will offer a guarantee not offered by the American commitment, is to deceive public opinion.

The French force can only be one element of the western ensemble, the defense of Europe during the next ten or fifteen years must be viewed within the Atlantic framework.

Instead of admitting this obvious truth one minister dreams up a Monroe doctrine for Europe (a formula which is not devoid of some involuntary irony when one recalls 1917 and 1944); while another one suggests that France, because of its nearness, will intervene with less hesitation in defense of Germany or Luxembourg than would a non-European State: the credibility of the deterrence becomes a function of geography and the three submarines of 1973 are supposed to impress the men in the Kremlin more than the 41 American submarines of 1969. Even though the French force -- for lack of a detection network -- can be unleashed only after an attack against the national territory itself, it is being nonsensically asserted that it contributes decisively to

the protection of all of Europe, while it simply adds one element of deterrence, providing it does not loosen the ties between the old continent and the United States.

I do not know what 'European Europe' means. The precedent of 'Algerian Algeria' is not encouraging. Everyone will agree that the long range aim is to reinstate Europe in its unity and greatness, to make it capable of defending itself alone, or better not to have to fear any longer for its security. At present the formula, with its American accent, is to say the least ambiguous. The defense of Europe might perhaps some day be a purely European matter, but this can happen only at the end of a phase of 'Atlanticism' which is going to be a long time.

The French government may succeed in preventing the formation of the multilateral force. In this case the diplomatic success will be acclaimed; if it does not succeed the failure will be dissimulated. Success or failure seem almost equally deplorable to me because they will both weaken the alliance. Even though responsibility for the present crisis must be shared, I have a feeling that the French government does not regret it. By speaking for years about reforming NATO without ever specifying the desired reforms, by insisting on the total independence of the French force without discussing the necessary co-ordination, it has spread concern and it has led our European partners to question our true objectives.

As soon as there arises a sort of competition between France and the United States -- a competition in which the Federal Republic of Germany represents the stakes -- Germany cannot fail to choose the United States. Whatever the future of the multilateral force German-American military ties are much more solid than Franco-German ties. How could it be otherwise? Either one country can protect another country with its deterrent force, and in this case the Federal Republic inevitably prefers the United States to France; or, as certain experts claim, those who have nuclear weapons can protect only themselves, but in this hypothesis the Federal Republic can count on France even less than on the United States.

The nuclear force gives France ammunition which might be valuable for eventual negotiations with the United States. It makes it possible for France to influence the strategy of the alliance. The Chief of State can also keep his finger on the trigger if he thinks that he thereby increases the 'credibility' of the threat. What is questionable is first of all the allocation of the sums provided for in the budget and the extreme concentration on weapons which are more useful against the ally than against the enemy. But it is also, and above all, the diplomatic-strategic concept in the name of which the manufacture of thermonuclear bombs and of atomic submarines receives absolute priority, a concept which has no chance of rallying the Europeans because these would eventually participate in an effort to have atomic weapons only if this effort were made in agreement with the United States.

If the creators of the Common Market had spoken and acted like General de Gaulle does today, the Common Market would not exist."

~~Background Use Only~~
7 June 1965

What is Fascism?
Fascist Characteristics Shown by Communists

1. Totalitarian Rule by the State.

Under fascism, the state under party direction assumed totalitarian power, i.e., power to control directly the totality of the national life. Regional governments lost all significant authority (e.g., over the police), and independent institutions such as the German central bank, the Reichsbank, eventually came under state control. This tendency toward totalitarian control is even more pronounced under Communism, where state planning is more thoroughgoing and private enterprise is not just curbed, organized, and channeled, as in the Italian Fascist corporate state, but is officially abolished, with all capital vested in the state. Where Nazism only placed certain choice parts of the economy directly in the hands of its rulers (e.g., the Hermann Goering Werke), Communist totalitarianism in effect gives all the national plant to the party elite, using the fiction that this plant is the property of "the people." In the USSR, the Kremlin sometimes changes the nominal state organization to give an appearance of decentralization (e.g., there is no central ministry at present for the uniformed criminal police), but central control remains effective through the CPSU and the secret police. The very fact that these changes are decreed routinely by the central leadership, without any debate or observable opposition, shows that there is no genuine change in the power structure. On the average, the Soviet economic organization is completely reorganized every two or three years.

2. Totalitarian Organization of the Masses.

Nazi practices of "Gleichschaltung" are paralleled by Communist party control of all social organizations: compare the Hitler Jugend with the Komsomols, the Arbeitsfront with Soviet trade unions. Both fascists and communists enlist the very young in their organizations: in Fascist Italy the Balilla, in Nazi Germany the Jungvolk, and in the USSR the October Children. Both spurn any literary or cultural activity which does not serve to propagandize the regime, condemning experimental art as "decadent." Both conduct "elections" with a single slate of candidates, and boast "Ja" votes of over 99%. Both maintain an elaborate domestic propaganda apparatus, designed to insulate the population from the outside world, and under both outside publications are banned or given mere token circulation. What Goebbels said when launching his Propaganda Ministry applies pari passie to Communist domestic propaganda: "The new Ministry has no other aim but to unite the nation behind the National Socialist idea." Both follow an ideology--though admittedly the Communist ideology is more elaborate--which is designed to provide a single, correct "line" for every occasion. Both also exploit feelings of inferiority, hatred,

(Cont.)

frustration, and desire for romantic adventure, and despise calmness, willingness to compromise, and the sense of responsibility.

3. Cult of the Leader.

At the moment, the Soviet Union does not have a single dominant leader, and the various contestants claim to form a collective leadership. But experience with previous "collective leaderships" after the deaths of Lenin and Stalin suggests that one leader will eventually dominate the others; there are signs already that Brezhnev is displacing Kosygin. The norm is dictatorship. Compare Hitler at Nuremberg or Mussolini on his balcony with Khrushchev or Stalin on Lenin's tomb and Mao on the reviewing stand in Peking: we see all the panoply of power deployed for the gratification of the man who wields it, and for the exaltation of his cult. Similarly, under both systems we find portraits of the Fuhrer or Vozhd (both mean "Leader") in every office, even every home. Compare the Italian Fascist slogan, "Mussolini is always right!" (Il Duce a sempre ragione) with Liu Shao-chi's 1956 statement that "during the 21 years since the Tsunyi Conference of January 1935, our Party, under the leadership of the Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-gung, has not made any mistake in its line." Note Brezhnev's praises of Khrushchev at the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961: "His tireless energy and revolutionary passion inspire us all to fighting deeds. Comrade Khrushchev is distinguished by his great faith in the people and in the strength of our party, by firmness and unyieldingness in carrying out its line, refusal to be reconciled with the enemies of Communism, and his boldness and resolution in carrying out the domestic and foreign policies of the party and Soviet state." Compare Goebbels' praise addressed to Hitler: "You became for us young Germans the symbol and sentinel of the new spirit of national and socialist solidarity."

4. Nationalism.

Soviet annexations of territory, e.g., Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Eastern Poland, East Prussia, Northern Bukovina, Eastern Czechoslovakia, Bessarabia, Finnish border areas, compare with the Nazi annexation of Austria, the Sudetenland, the Polish Corridor, etc. Note Soviet boasts of prowess in space, claims to single-handed victory over Germany, and assertions that they have invented every significant modern invention (latest example, June 1965: the tank). German nationalist references to the Fatherland are paralleled by Soviet references to the "Soviet motherland." Note also Chinese territorial claims and irredentist maps, similar to maps current in Germany before World War II. Peking also tries to erase minority traditions and languages within Chinese borders, assimilating minority groups into the mass of Han Chinese. (20,000 Moslems revolted in 1952 in Kansu Province, and in recent years Chinese Moslems have fled to the USSR.) For both fascists and Communists, extreme partisanship leads to curious distortions: the enemy's defense is

"...the fascist Communist invasion and subjugation is a 'liberation.'"

5. Hostility to Religion.

That Communist regimes are hostile to organized religion--except when they can control it--is well known. These regimes periodically call for new efforts to promote atheism, and churches are turned into "museums" for ridiculing religion. Many have now forgotten that the Nazis also tried to extinguish religion. Thousands of Catholics were imprisoned in 1933, and Catholic newspapers and youth organizations were abolished. Among the Protestants, Pastor Niemöller, Bishop Dibelius, and Pastor Grüber came into conflict with the regime, and 804 Protestants were arrested in 1937 alone. (Since 1945 Dibelius's difficulties have continued, now with the Ulbricht regime.) Both fascists and Communists are particularly anxious to keep youth out of the Churches, and vigorously suppress church youth activities; various ceremonies (e.g., the East German Jugendweihe) are substituted for confirmation. Churches are not abolished outright, however, since a well-controlled church organization helps the authorities to keep an eye on the population, especially its older members. The totalitarians do not really take a stand on principle; their basic objection to religion is that it affords a competing center of interest and loyalty, and interferes with their aim of total control of the citizen.

6. Militarism.

In the uniforms of the Soviet marshals, as in the use of the goose-step by the East German and Soviet armies, the Soviet military often seems to ape the display of Hitler's soldiers. The Chinese Communists shun these externals, but they do not lack militaristic ideas; Mao has said, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," and Peking has militarized practically the whole population, under the slogan "Everyone a Soldier." The Chinese would agree with Hitler's statement that the task of the statesman is "to transpose a whole nation into a mental state of unconditional military willingness and military readiness." Both Nazis and Communists love to use militaristic concepts and images in non-military contexts: "front," "storm," "brigade," "march," "attack," "fighter," "comrade," "weapon"--all these words are used metaphorically by both. Both varieties of totalitarians worry about maintaining military spirit: Marshal Malinovsky has written in Pravda (Sept. 14, 1961), "We must skillfully propagate the fighting traditions of our valiant armed forces and inculcate in the Soviet people, especially among youth, love for military matters, aspiration for technical knowledge, applied forms of sport, and the study of military traditions"; and Hitler said in 1932, "In the future, armies even if militarily excellent will be worthless unless the peoples who stand behind them think like soldiers, and therefore are dedicated to the same deeds and the same sacrifices."

7. Racism.

Racism is not a Communist doctrine, but anti-semitic tendencies are still widespread in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and are exploited by the Communist regimes. In order to discredit private trading--which still continues after nearly 50 years of Communism --the Soviet press publicizes the names of Jewish "profiteers" and "black marketeers," and ignores the names of non-Jewish party officials who are involved. In 1964, the State Publishing House at Kishinev published a booklet ("Contemporary Judaism and Zionism," by F.S. Mayatsky) which linked Washington, Tel Aviv and Jews in Soviet synagogues in "an international Jewish conspiracy," and which carried cartoons reminiscent of those in Julius Streicher's Der Stürmer. African students have met with racial discrimination in Sofia, Baku, and Moscow. Peking for its part is promoting a covert racism in its efforts to exclude Soviet influence from Asia and Africa, and in Mao's claims that "the East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind."

8. Secret Police Terror.

As Mihajlo Mihajlov pointed out in "Moscow Summer 1964," the Soviet Union operated concentration camps a decade before Hitler came to power. The Soviet secret police system--known successively as the Cheka, the GPU, the OGPU, the NKVD, the MGB and now the KGB--likewise antedated the Nazi Gestapo and Totenkopf SS, as well as the Italian Fascist OVRA. Under both fascism and Communism, the people learned to dread the midnight knock on the door; even though the insane asylum now replaces the concentration camp, the police are still feared. Fear is part of the system. In 1958, Khrushchev warned the Hungarian people by recalling Lenin's doctrine that "the dictatorship of the proletariat presupposes the application of mercilessly hard, quick, and firm force in order to suppress every attempt of the exploiters," that is, of any opposition.

9. Use of Subversion and Fifth Column Activity.

There are differences between the fascist Fifth Columns and Communist subversion, arising from the different appeals of these movements; the Nazis largely used German nationals or ex-nationals abroad, and sought other foreign support on the basis of anti-semitism and anti-Bolshevism, while the Communists make more use of ideology, appeal least of all to their own ex-nationals, and invoke the slogans of anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism, and anti-fascism. But there are also interesting resemblances between groups like the Sudetendeutsche Partei and the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam, or the Congolese rebels. In all these cases there are paramilitary organizations supported from outside with funds and equipment, pretending to be independent of their real sponsorship. Such groups are active minorities, claiming to speak for a majority (after annexation, only one in every 30 Sudeten

Germans joined the Nazi party). Both Communists and fascists take power by what are actually coups d'etat (the "October Revolution," the "March on Rome," the Machtergreifung), using dupes (the Left Social Revolutionaries in 1917, the Hugenberg Nationalists in 1933), not real revolutions. Both also employ puppet governments in conquered territories: Vichy France, the Ustashi in Croatia, Ulbricht in East Germany.

Fact Sheet

~~Background Use Only~~
7 June 1965Chinese Communist Threat to Thailand

Early in 1965 Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi told a visiting diplomat "we may have a guerrilla war going in Thailand before the end of this year." He predicted that after the Communists sent enough arms and supplies to the Thai insurgents, an "internal war" would overthrow the Thai government. An increase in Communist subversive activities in Thailand over the past few months makes it appear that Chen Yi knew what he was talking about. The increased Communist activity is following the standard Communist pattern, beginning with the formation of Communist Fronts to cover the hand of the Communists and to attract the widest possible range of support from various dissident groups. In this case the Fronts are called the "Thailand Independence Movement" and the "Patriotic Front of Thailand." The first announcement of the formation of both Fronts came from a clandestine radio located either in Communist China or North Vietnam that calls itself the "Voice of the People of Thailand." Radio Peking and the New China News Agency immediately echoed the announcement and added that the formation of these groups was of important significance for the "revolutionary struggle" in Thailand.

The clandestine Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), controlled by Peking, played the key role in the formation of the new Fronts. The initial manifesto of the "Thai Independence Movement" bore remarkable similarity to the message that the Thai Communist Party sent to Peking on the occasion of China's National Day. The CPT message mentioned Peking's "correct leadership" and "resolute opposition to modern revisionism," and then in discussing the situation in Thailand, called for a united front of "all democratic classes, strata, public organizations, and individuals" to overthrow the present government, drive out the Americans and set up a coalition government based on a policy of "independence, neutrality, peace and democracy." The CPT added that it was "willing to cooperate" with any and all groups and individuals who support this "patriotic line." The message concluded that if the Thais waged an all-out struggle they would win complete victory "just as the Chinese people have done."

Not long after the above CPT message was sent to Peking, the clandestine radio "Voice of the People of Thailand" announced the formation of the "Patriotic Front of Thailand" and began to publicize the six-point program of the new "Patriotic Front." Their six-point program called for cancellation of all military, technical and aid programs between the U.S. and Thailand; withdrawal of all U.S. troops; overthrow of the present Thai government; renunciation of the national Constitution; a policy of peace and neutrality; and the establishment of a government composed of patriotic and democratic people.

The setting up of these fronts is remarkably similar to the pattern in South Vietnam, where in 1960 the "National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam" was formed in direct response to the instructions of the North Vietnamese Communist Party to form a united front of all "patriotic" elements to overthrow the government and drive out "U.S. imperialism." There are a number of other

the Viet Cong in South Vietnam several years ago. Lately there have been several assassinations of provincial people who have been particularly effective in meeting the needs of the people and thereby undercutting the false Communist claim to being the "only real protector of the people's interests." Communist propaganda harps on the themes that the Thanom government is a "stooge for U.S. imperialism" and that the government in Bangkok is nothing more than "a corrupt instrument for exploiting the Thai people." This tactic of attempting to drive a wedge between the people and their own government leaders was also used by the Viet Cong in early stages of the aggression against South Vietnam.

The Thanom government is well aware of the Communist threat to their country. It is planning new measures to supplement existing civic action programs and has appropriated an additional \$20 million for such use in the northeastern provinces. The program is aimed at countering Communist subversion by developing a sound local administrative apparatus to look after the needs of the people and give them a sense of identification with the central government. The Thai leaders know exactly what they must do. In addition to the above civic-action programs, the Thais keep in a state of readiness their 150,000-man army and their air force newly equipped with some 40 modern fighter planes. On March 9, 1965, Foreign Minister Khoman warned that Communist China "has no respect whatsoever for international law." He also pointed out that "neutrality no longer provides sanctuary. We have seen in Laos, India and elsewhere that neutrality does not free any country from attack, from being subverted, or from becoming a victim of aggression."